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Design matters: Tensions between democratic quality and productive 
collaboration 
 





In response to increasing democratic disenchantment, and the risk of losing legitimacy, 
many local governments are experimenting with new, innovative forms of citizen involvement. 
This is also the case in the Danish non-profit public housing sector, which is currently 
experiencing declining resident participation in a formerly highly well organized and successful 
form of democratic resident organization. As a result of this decline in resident participation, 
elected board members have become isolated, and the lack of input from local residents in terms 
of ideas, knowledge and political support has reduced the boards’ ability to make political 
decisions that respond to the residents’ problems and needs. Theories of collaborative 
governance propose that the introduction of interactive forms of democracy and policy-making 
that bring politicians and residents together may offer promising means to engage citizens and 
enhance the quality of democratic decision-making. This article presents the results of a case 
study of two local housing associations that are experimenting with innovative forms of 
democracy through different designs. One housing association has an open access design and the 
other one a restricted access design. The article studies how the two different innovative 
democratic designs affect collaboration between residents and their political representatives. 
Based on a combination of interviews, observations and documents, the case study shows that 
innovative democratic designs strengthens the quality of political decisions and relations 
between residents and political representatives. Surprisingly, the case study also finds that the 
open access design features greater secrecy than the restricted access design.  
Key words: Democratic innovation, local government, collaborative policy innovation, 





Democratic disenchantment is increasing (Norris, 2011; Pitkin, 2004; Smith, 2009; 
Stoker, 2006), as evidenced by declining party membership and voter turnout and increasing 
distrust in elected governments in most Western countries, not least at the local government level 
(Pitkin, 2004). Representative democracy has undeniably been a tremendous success (Sørensen 
and Torfing, 2019); there have never been as many countries with representative democracy as at 
present, giving larger numbers of citizens the power to elect their political representatives and to 
hold them accountable on Election Day (Warren, 2002). On the other hand, despite these 
growing opportunities for influence, traditional representative democracy is also facing severe 
challenges as the connection between politicians and citizens is thinning, thereby reducing the 
ability of politicians to represent the people (Smith, 2009). Political parties have very few 




members and the political representatives have sparse communication with their voters between 
elections. Large mass-media corporations that treat politics as entertainment govern public 
debate, and focusses on dramatic events and conflicts between individuals. There are hardly any 
spaces for deliberation between political leaders and their followers, which tends to spur the 
development of mutual mistrust between the leaders and the led. 
 
In response to growing democratic disenchantment, many local governments are 
experimenting with innovative forms of democracy aimed at engaging citizens more actively and 
directly in policymaking by building platforms and arenas that facilitate politician‒citizen 
interaction. I study the impact of innovative democratic designs on the collaboration between 
citizens and their political representatives. Overall, the article can be placed in the literature 
concerning collaborative governance aimed at solving complex problems (Ansell and Gash, 
2018; Ansell and Torfing, 2015; Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015; Torfing and Ansell, 2017). 
Furthermore, the article studies experiments with collaborative governance with focus on 
innovative democratic designs (Fung, 2006; Geissel and Newton, 2012; Michels, 2012; Smith, 
2009). In times marked by growing disenchantment with the democratic institutions of 
representative government, this article contributes to the literature by producing empirical 
evidence of local governments involving citizens in policymaking that affects their own lives. 
 
The development of democratic disenchantment and difficulties in solving a growing 
number of complex problems has spread to the Danish housing associations. Two such 
associations have launched experiments with collaborative policy forums that they denote task 
groups. These housing associations are selected because they are first movers aiming to improve 
the conditions for local democracy and collaboration between residents and political 
representatives. The housing associations pose two different contexts for studying innovative 
democratic designs, prompting me to ask the following research question: How do innovative 
democratic designs affect the collaboration between residents and their political representatives? 
A sub-question upon which I will also focus is how the design of collaborative policy forums 
accommodates democratic political representation by improving the relationships and 
interactions between politicians and residents. Here, tension might be rising between the broader 
inclusion of ideas and difficulties in reaching a common understanding. The housing associations 
offer different contexts in that the one housing association has designed the task group with open 
access for everyone, whereas the other has designed the task group with restricted access for 
selected participants. This distinction between the two cases presents an interesting opportunity 
to study the impact of how collaboration has been designed differently. When studying the 
innovative democratic designs, I focus on three classical norms of democracy—participation, 
deliberation and transparency—while also examining possible tensions relating to the innovative 
democratic designs and how these tensions affect the collaboration between the residents and 
their political representatives. To study the resident‒political representative collaboration, I will 
focus on the process and outcome of the collaboration, from which I can also assess the 
democratic quality of the collaboration. 
 
The local housing associations are experimenting with interesting democratic innovations 
linking traditional institutions of representative democracy with collaborative arenas in which 
residents and their political representatives engage in joint problem solving. By studying such 




innovations, we can learn more about the role of institutional design in processes of democratic 
renewal aimed at spurring collaborative policymaking. 
 
The article is structured as follows. First, I develop a theoretical framework for studying 
and analyzing the innovative democratic designs with particular emphasis on the tensions related 
to the democratic norms of participation, deliberation and transparency. Second, I introduce the 
housing associations, their traditional representative democracy model and their new task groups. 
I explain the case selection and describe the data collection methods. Third, I turn to an analysis 
of the two contexts of innovative democratic designs. The conclusion presents the main findings 
on how innovative democratic designs condition efforts to cope with key democratic challenges 
in Danish housing associations as well as in representative democracy more broadly. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework  
 
In recent decades, collaborative governance has been seen as a tool for developing new 
ideas, spurring joint learning and creating shared ownership of new solutions to wicked problems 
(Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh, 2012). There is broad agreement in collaborative governance 
research that there is massive potential to be reaped from involving citizens in the productive 
collaboration of policymaking and complex problem-solving (Ansell, 2015; Emerson and 
Nabatchi, 2015; Smith, 2009). The literature has primarily focused on how administrators can 
solve increasingly complex problems by involving and gaining input from affected citizens and 
relevant stakeholders (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Osborne, Radnor and Strokosch, 2016). New 
research shows that collaborative governance can also solve challenges for local politicians 
missing input and legitimacy (Sørensen and Torfing, 2018). I use the following definition of 
collaborative governance: 
 
[A]s the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management 
that engage people across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, 
and/or the public, private, and civic spheres to carry out a public purpose that could not 
otherwise be accomplished (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015, p. 18). 
 
As Emerson and Nabatchi underline, the focus of collaborative governance is exactly on 
engaging relevant actors in policy decision-making across potential boarders to solve problems 
and create value. What makes the collaboration productive is emphasized in both its process and 
results; a fruitful process in which actors feel engaged, heard, seen, included and able to 
influence the decisions, which also produces an actual outcome. 
 
Another focus within collaborative governance is the role of the political leaders. The 
portrayal of political leaders in classical leadership theory as “elected kings” (Sørensen, 2006) 
with sovereign power is long gone. The image of government is challenged by the rise of 
interactive and collaborative forms of governance. The surge of governance is prompted by the 
growing complexity of the challenges facing Western societies (Torfing et al., 2012). The 
increased use of governance networks means that increasing numbers of policy decisions are 
made in arenas with relevant actors in cross-border collaborations in order to solve common 
challenges. To give the politicians opportunity to reap the fruits of collaborative governance, it is 




necessary to design innovative democratic arenas in which politicians can engage in problem-
solving with relevant and affected actors (Skelcher and Torfing, 2010; Sørensen and Torfing, 
2018; Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997). Local politicians can use the collaborative 
governance in new arenas to strengthen their political leadership by defining societal problems 
and challenges, developing new solutions and mobilizing support (Tucker, 1995). 
 
Innovative Democratic Design 
Relevant arenas composed of affected actors do not simply arise spontaneously when 
needed. When constructing such arenas, institutional design based on crucial choices is necessary 
and requires careful institutional planning and design (Egeberg and Trondal, 2018; Torfing et al., 
2012). Several strands of new institutional theory (Peters, 2012) structure and routinize practices 
relating to forums in several ways. Institutional design expands the concept of new 
institutionalism. I use the definition: 
 
[…] the devising and realization of rules, procedures, and organizational structures that 
will enable and constrain behavior and action so as to accord with held values, achieve 
desired objectives, or execute given tasks (Alexander, 2005, p. 213). 
 
In practice, institutional design choices concerning task group policymaking revolve 
around choosing the theme, participants, frequency of meetings and mandate of the group. 
Innovative democratic designs disrupt old designs by offering new ways of organizing 
democratic decision-making processes. Innovative democratic designs are not necessarily a 
previously unseen innovation, as they will often be a new design that has been adopted and 
adapted from another setting. When constructing innovative democratic designs, several 
democratic norms must be considered. The overall choice becomes when deciding to introduce 
collaborative policy arenas that combine notions of new participatory and deliberative 
democracy with established, traditional models of representative democracy. The result becomes 
a hybrid form of democracy (Sørensen and Torfing, 2019). When constructing innovative 
democratic designs, it is possible to meddle with several democratic norms and to assess the 
democratic designs in various ways. The focus in this study is on three democratic norms—
participation, deliberation and transparency—which are chosen because they represent crucial 
parts of a democratic process. I have chosen these three norms as a sum of the existing 
democratic literature, as they cover much of the broad previous literature on democratic 
evaluations (Dahl, 1989a; Geissel and Joas, 2013; Michels, 2011; Smith, 2009). In the following 
section, I will present each of the three democratic norms and describe some of the possible 
democratic tensions between the norms that possibly affect the productive collaboration. 
 
Participation denotes the fact that the members of a political community are actively 
involved in governing their own affairs. Major aspects of participation relate to presence, the 
question of what it means to participate, and how this participation takes place. For instance, are 
people actively involved in making political decisions or do they appoint representatives to do so 
on their behalf? The next question is, what does it mean to represent? Do elected participants 
represent their population (e.g. age, sex, gender)? When designing a task group, participation can 
also spur questions about presence, inclusion, voice, quantity, equality and access (Geissel and 
Newton, 2012; Lijphart, 1997; Smith, 2009) (concerning representative bureaucracy, see Meier, 
1975). These participation-related questions are important because they can help determine the 




legitimacy and validity of a collaborative policy forum. Furthermore, it is possible to distinguish 
between inclusive and meaningful participation (Geissel and Newton, 2012, p. 16). Inclusive 
participation relates to the number of participants, the opportunities for participation and the 
composition of the group of participants. Meaningful participation relates to participants feeling 
that their participation matters and that politicians care for their input. Do the participants have 
influence on the decision-making process along the way, on the agenda and topics? Moreover, do 
they have an impact on the final solutions? 
 
Deliberation is a communicative process whereby participants are viewed as equals and 
as open to having their preferences shaped and transformed (Hendriks, Dryzek and Hunold, 
2007). Deliberation indicates collective decision-making through the participation of the actors 
who will be affected by decisions or by their political representatives (Ayres, Sandford and 
Coombes, 2017). The proponents of deliberative democracy highlight how one of the disorders 
of representative democracy concerns how citizens’ preferences and opinions are rarely well 
thought through (Geissel and Joas, 2013). Deliberative democracy proposes deliberative 
procedures by which citizens reflect on their preferences and make reasoned decisions. 
Collaborative policy arenas can create opportunities for flexible and receptive deliberation, such 
as by broadening out the range of participants beyond the formal institutions of representative 
democracy (Sørensen, 2016). While collaborative policy arenas can create space to explore, 
discuss and deliberate innovative policy solutions, the arenas can also be used to sideline critical 
actors from key decisions and enhance the power and control of the elites (Ayres, Sandford and 
Coombes, 2017). There is agreement in the literature on deliberative democracy that deliberation 
involves discussion and the exchange of arguments, where individuals justify their opinions and 
show that they are willing to change their preferences (Michels, 2011). A deliberative process 
assumes that free public reasoning, equality and the inclusion of different interests build on 
mutual respect. Moreover, deliberative democracy scholars argue that deliberation contributes to 
the legitimacy of decisions (Hendriks, Dryzek and Hunold, 2007) and that bringing political 
representatives, administrators and residents together in a problem-focused deliberative process 
often stimulates policy innovation (Torfing, 2016). 
 
Transparency is part of any open political decision-making process in which decision-
makers can be sanctioned and held accountable for their actions (Ayres, Sandford and Coombes, 
2017). The process transparency of a collaborative policy arena is important to keep; it refers to 
participants feeling that the discussions are genuine and that the collaborative process is not a 
cover for other deals (Ansell and Gash, 2008). There are risks of undermining transparency and 
accountability when introducing collaborative policy arenas, because the lines become more 
blurred (Ayres, Sandford and Coombes, 2017). Lacking transparency can lead to mistrust in the 
governing institutions. Another aspect of transparency is the internal information from 
facilitators and politicians to citizens and the external dissemination of the group’s work to, for 
example, the rest of the organization. One method to keep the right people accountable is to let 
them formulate the overall mandate and ultimately make the final decision; in so doing, the 
political process is stored. 
 
Processes of producing solutions to pressing problems that are both innovative and 
agreed upon by the included actors are not easy tasks. The process in itself inherits an overall 
tension between innovation and policy. Innovation grounds on a multitude of diverse inputs from 














different angles, and the opposite is applicable for policy, which thrives on shared interests and 
similarities (Page and Kern, 2016). Some additional tensions exist between these dimensions 
when deciding to construct innovative democratic designs. Tension arises between deliberation 
and transparency because the more transparent and open the task group, the less deliberation 
might take place (Leirset, 2019). Conversely, less transparency can have a negative influence on 
a group’s legitimacy. The higher the number of participants included, the more difficult it 
becomes for actors to understand each other’s points of view. The exchange of arguments and 
discussions might be hindered if the participants are very similar to one another. Tension exists 
within deliberation and deliberative theories. On the one hand, deliberation works best when 
participants have different views; on the other, it is also requires that participants are open to 
changing their minds (Hendriks, Dryzek and Hunold, 2007). To limit dilemmas, there are 
important choices to balance and considerations to make. 
 
The policy-related involvement of citizens outside of electoral processes can take many 
forms and serve different purposes (Michels, 2011; Smith, 2009). One such purpose can be to 
obtain opinions or votes from individuals or collectively from a group. Another can refer to the 
focus on the process or outcome of citizen involvement. My later analysis will focus on how the 
innovative democratic designs affect both the process and outcome of the collaboration between 
residents and political representatives. To further structure the analysis, I present the following 
assumptions based on the presented theoretical framework. 
 
1. Innovative democratic designs bringing residents and their political representatives 
together will result in productive collaboration. 
2. The degree of participation, deliberation and transparency in the democratic designs will 
have consequences for the collaborative process and outcome. 
 











The Local Housing Associations 
 
Before turning to the method and data collection, I will introduce the field in question. 
The empirical domain of this article is the Danish non-profit public housing sector, which is 
currently the second most popular type of housing and comprising 20% of all dwellings in 
Denmark. Some 700 housing associations manage 8000 local housing departments. People can 
acquire a dwelling by signing up on a waiting list, and dwellings are distributed according to 
seniority on the list. Additionally, since 1984, the municipalities have had the right to assign 


















dwellings to those who are challenged when it comes to obtaining housing on market terms. 
Some residents have social problems (unemployment, poor health etc.), although they are far 
from the majority. Still, the rapid development of the sector throughout the 1960s‒1980s resulted 
in physical deprivation and neglected areas, and the assignment of dwellings to people in need 
has contributed to the sector now suffering from a somewhat tarnished reputation. The sector 
features a long tradition of resident democracy (Hansen and Langergaard, 2017; Jensen, 1997). 
Resident democracy has roots in legislation, which ensures that the residents have the majority 
say in all decision-making boards (Almenboligloven, 2019). The institutional set-up in the 
housing associations follows the principals of representative democracy (Jensen, 1998). Figure 2 
illustrates the formal resident democracy in a housing association. The board of representatives is 
the highest authority, followed by a political governing board and then the local department 
boards. The residents elect their political representatives for all of the decision-making boards. 
The hierarchal organization of housing associations means that the real power and influence is in 
the board of representatives and political governing board (KAB, 2016); the department-level 
latitude is limited. 
 





















Together with the municipalities, the public housing sector is a cornerstone in Danish 
local democracy. As described in the introduction, many local governments are experimenting 
with innovative forms of citizen involvement in response to growing democratic disenchantment 
and challenges to political legitimacy. Gentofte Kommune is an example of a local government 
that is experimenting with its democratic setups. The municipality has supplemented its 
representative democratic structure with ad hoc forums in which citizens, politicians and 
employees work together to find solutions to challenges (Sørensen and Torfing, 2019). Gentofte 
has inspired the public housing sector, which suffers from some of the same challenges. Two 
Danish housing associations have introduced task groups in order to co-create innovative 
solutions through interaction between residents and their political representatives. Figure 3 









illustrates the traditional style of collaboration between political representatives and residents 
isolated from one another. The circle illustrates the new form of collaboration in which all actors 
collaborate in task groups. 
 










Some internal pressures have challenged the housing associations to consider 
collaboration and problem solving anew. These internal pressures have led the housing 
associations to introduce task groups to supplement their existing representative democracy due 
to growing democratic disenchantment and the need to strengthen the ability of political 
representatives to make decisions on a well-informed basis, thereby enabling them to meet 
residents’ interests and needs. However, there are also external pressures besides demands about 
effectiveness and austerity. External pressures come from the national-level politicians who have 
devoted considerable attention to problem-filled housing areas. The new, so-called ghetto list 
introduced in Denmark features a number of criteria deciding whether a local housing area 
constitutes a ghetto. If the housing area is on this list for four consecutive years, a considerable 
fraction of the local dwellings must be torn down (Regeringen, 2018). This threat prompts the 
public housing associations to do everything they can to avoid the ghetto list. At a more general 
level, the housing associations are interested in staying well-organized and providing attractive 
housing opportunities for a broad group of residents. There is no guarantee that the creation of 
new collaborative policy arenas in local housing associations will meet all of these challenges, 
but according to the housing associations themselves and with inspiration from Gentofte, it is an 
experiment to help mobilize the resources and energy of the local residents. The local housing 
associations are examples of local governments that consist of an administration and elected 
political representatives. The housing associations constitute an empirical context with 





The housing associations included are first movers in terms of being the first Danish 
housing associations to have introduced collaborative policy forums of this sort. That is why the 
cases have been selected for this article. The housing associations are inspired by Gentofte and 
its successful work with task committees for years (Sørensen and Torfing, 2018). Overall, the 
public housing sector provides favorable conditions for experimenting with innovative 
democratic designs. The favorable conditions are steady and consensus-seeking democratic set-
ups focused on social capital and welfare solutions and traditions regarding public and private 
collaboration. However, there might also be some challenging conditions due to the demography 




of the public housing sector, which is below the national average of income and education. These 
factors correlate negatively with active democratic participation (Scharpf, 1994). I have included 
two task groups from different housing associations, 3B and AL2. In the following part, I will 
describe each housing association to account for their context for the later analysis (Yin, 2014). 
The thicker descriptions of each of the associations’ task groups will follow in the first part of 
the analysis. 
 
The 3B housing association has its offices in Copenhagen, the Danish capital, and 
consists of 300 employees. There are around 12000 dwellings with more than 20000 residents 
(3B, n.d.-a). The task groups are part of 3B’s overall organizational strategy to secure an active 
and attractive resident democracy (3B, 2016). 3B has made use of task groups since autumn 
2016, and since then the housing association has completed a total of six task groups (3B, n.d.-
b). 3B political governing board introduced the task group subject to this article. The task group 
was designed with restricted access design, where only invited residents could participate. 
 
The AL2 housing association is located in Jutland, just outside Aarhus, which is 
Denmark’s second-largest city. AL2 has 100 employees, around 5000 dwellings and more than 
9000 residents (AL2bolig, n.d.). AL2 was inspired by 3B to work with task groups and has had 
one such group so far (AL2bolig, 2018); they are not part of the overall organizational strategy. 
The AL2 political governing board formed its first task group with an open-access design in 
which all residents were invited to participate. 
 
The task groups included create new arenas for collaborative policymaking by letting 
political representatives and residents work together over a relatively brief period to solve 
pressing community problems. The case choice of this study is aligned with the research 
question of how innovative democratic designs affect collaboration. The cases are different in 
sameness in the sense that the housing associations have introduced innovative democratic 
designs with different approaches to their respective organizations. The difference-in-design 
creates different contexts. One task group features a restricted access design where selected 
residents are invited to participate. The other features an open access design where all residents 
are invited to participate. The presented cases pose different contexts for studying innovative 
democratic design in practice. Given the difference between the two task groups, one might 
assume that the open access design would score better regarding the democratic norms presented 
above in the theory section and that the collaboration would therefore be of higher democratic 
quality. The housing associations are relatively similar in many aspects other than the difference-
in-design. They provide the same work and service and meet the same challenges. The cases are 
therefore similar enough to be compared. The purpose of studying different cases is to gain 
empirical knowledge regarding innovative democratic designs and the impact they have on the 
collaboration between civic and political actors. I analyse and compare the cases in terms of 
innovative democratic design, process and outcome. I study the context of each case separately 
and in comparison. In the discussion, I elaborate on the two contexts, the differences, sameness 
and their impact on each collaboration. The conclusions I am able to draw from this case study 
are based on empirical windows (Czarniawska, 1997) into a more general interaction between 
civic and political actors. 
 




Although the findings from the following empirical analysis may be difficult to 
generalize due to the particularity of the strong, consensus-oriented democracy and high level of 
trust in institutions that are favorable conditions for civic engagement, and furthermore are 
characteristic for Danish local governments in an international context, it still may stimulate 
attempts to bolster local representative governments elsewhere. The possibilities for 
generalization to an international context vary from learnings about resident democracy, 
comparisons to member democratic setups, securing input on relevant matters to reach 
sustainable solutions and increasing social capital through involvement and engagement.  
 
Table 1: Data 
 
 Data from housing association with 
restricted access design 
Data from housing association 
with open access design 
 
Documents Web page about organization, minutes 
from meetings in the political 
governing board, mandate, descriptions 
of task groups. 
 
Web page about organization, 
minutes from meetings in the 
political governing board. 
Observations of meetings Task group (4), board of 
representatives (1), political governing 
board (1) 
 
Task group (2), board of 
representatives (1), political 
governing board (1) 
Interviews Residents (3), political representatives 
(2), administration (3) 
 
Residents (2), political 
representatives (3), administration 
(2) 
 
The documents include introductions to the field of non-profit housing, official 
documents from the housing associations, strategies, written mandates, policy briefs and all other 
documents concerning the task groups. In the case of 3B, I have also included an evaluation of 
the task groups, which was completed by the housing association. The non-participatory 
observations were collected to gain insight into the task group work. I observed a couple of 
meetings in each case. The observations provided knowledge about the specific task groups and 
a sense of life in the housing association. The interviews with employees focused on the 
procedural framing of the task groups, while the interviews with political representatives and 
residents focused on the task group work. The interviews have been transcribed and coded 
manually. In the empirical analysis of the data, I have searched for themes relating to innovative 
democratic design concerning participation, deliberation and transparency. Moreover, I looked 
for themes concerning the collaboration between residents and their political representatives 





To answer my question on how innovative democratic designs affect the collaboration 
between residents and their political representatives, the analysis is structured as follows. First, I 
study the task groups’ innovative democratic designs in practice. Second, I study the impact of 




the designs on the process and outcome of the collaboration between residents and political 
representatives, which will help me to detect the democratic quality of the task groups. 
 
Innovative Democratic Design: The Restricted Access Group 
The empirical study shows how the housing association has relatively clear procedures 
and rules for forming and constructing new task groups. They use a standardized template when 
a new task group is established and introduced to the organization. The political governing board 
then formulates a written mandate for each new task group. The mandates are all accessible on 
the housing association website, where a designated website has been made for the task groups. 
The website also includes information and updates about the work in the task groups, and the 
group’s final product can be found on the website when the group is terminated (3B, 2019). 
There seems to be political support for the task groups from the organization. 
 
To improve budgets and efficiency, the housing association recently decided to join a 
shared administrative service with another public housing association in Copenhagen. The 
housing association continues on its own to govern and maintain its dwellings, but the two 
organizations now share some of the service functions offered to the residents and the local 
housing departments. This merger has triggered many concerns among the residents. The task 
group studied in this article was mandated to consider how the relation between the new-shared 
administrative service and the local housing boards and residents could be improved for both the 
organizations and communications in order to secure and strengthen local democracy and 
resident services. The task group decided during their process to do a handbook about the merger 
with the other housing association. The handbook answers some of the biggest concerns from the 
residents, displays new opportunities for the residents in the merger, clarifies the role of the local 
housing boards, and establishes a transparent procedure for getting on the waiting list for a new 
dwelling. 
 
Two members of the political governing board, two additional political representatives 
and an administrative facilitator were appointed to the group. The resident members were 
individually invited to participate in the task group. The housing association also has an interest 
list on their website for residents to sign up for future task groups. However, the housing 
association quickly learned that those who registered on the website tended to be the “the usual 
suspects;” persons who were already involved in other democratic activities. As the head of the 
secretariat explains:  
 
Who is recruited to the task group is important – both in relation to interests and 
competences and to attempt to maintain some degree of control. 
 
As another manager explains: 
 
We try to appoint residents we believe are particularly suited to solve this particular 
task. That is no secret. 
 
The task group held four relatively informal meetings consisting of a combination of 
short presentations from employees giving guest speeches, brainstorming, group work and joint 
discussions. During the first couple of meetings, the group focused on finding common ground 




for concrete problem solving. The focus later shifted to producing clear results and 
recommendations for presentation to the political governing board. 
 
Innovative Democratic Design: The Open Access Group 
The empirical analysis reflects how working with this task group format remains 
relatively new for the housing association. The task group appear to enjoy political support from 
the organization. However, there is no accessible mandate describing the task groups. The 
housing association has a designated website on their website, where only limited information 
about the task groups can be found. 
 
Due to complaints from residents because of construction and repair work, a task group 
was created to discuss communication and the roles between external firms and the housing 
associations when such work was to take place. The task group was first asked to make policy 
recommendations to the political governing board concerning this matter and to create some kind 
of deliverable (e.g. a pamphlet). The administrative facilitator describes how, during the process, 
the political governing board’s request of the task group changed so that only a recommendations 
for a new communication policy was required, which annoyed some of the residents. 
 
Two members of the political governing board and two administrative facilitators were 
appointed to the group. The resident members were invited via a broad invitation to all the 
housing association residents. The invitation was posted on the website and at a Board of 
Representatives meeting, where all the democratically active residents are present. The task 
group held four relatively informal meetings, which were a combination of short presentations 
from employees and guest speakers, brainstorming, group work and joint discussions. At the first 
meeting, 30 residents showed up. The facilitator explains: “The invitation was imprecise, and 
many people had misunderstood the point of the meeting.” 
 
Many residents thought that it was an information meeting about the possible renovation 
of their dwellings. The meeting did not go as planned. For the most part, people just voiced their 
negative experiences and complaints, which was not particularly conducive to innovative 
policymaking. Although it is possible that some frustrated residents might have gotten some 
things off their chest. The number of participants declined after that first meeting, and less than 
one-third of those from the first meeting remained in the group, which ended up consisting of 
around seven participants. During the later meetings, the group became clearer about their task, 
which was providing input to policy recommendations to the board. 
 
Design Impact on Collaboration: The Restricted Access Group 
My observations and interviews reveal a high level of engagement from the local 
residents, who take pride in participating actively in the process. Access was clearly restricted in 
this task group, which limits transparency to some degree in that only the invited participants 
know what happen at the task group meetings. However, the task group did regularly update 
their website describing their work. The facilitator made a big deal of ensuring procedural 
transparency. The participants were introduced to the task group’s mandate at the first meeting, 
where the work format was also presented. The first meeting began with a preliminary 
brainstorming session on the overall topic to secure and strengthen local democracy and services 
for residents. One resident left the task group after the first meeting because she felt the 




brainstorming process was far too rushed. It made her feel like the work schedule was too tight 
and that the political leaders and the administrator steered the process too much. Despite losing 
her, the other participants all agreed that the final policy recommendations contained new ideas 
that would not have been taken in if it had not been for the work of the task group. 
 
In the later stages of the process, participants were involved in refining the final product 
and making new suggestions, a process that took place at the last task group meeting and via 
follow-up emails, which was a very transparent process that rendered it possible for everyone to 
see who had made which changes to the material. Besides disseminating the task group’s work 
on their website, different task group participants shared their experiences at Board of 
Representatives meetings and on other relevant occasions. 
 
Over the course of the process, the participants were all welcome to express opinions 
regardless of their position in the organization hierarchy. One resident explains how the 
discussions stimulated learning in the process: 
 
Participating in the task group gave me opportunity to express my opinion and to raise 
critical concerns. I also listened to the other participants, who had other concerns and 
worries – to compare my own concerns with theirs. The discussions helped me see 
things in a different light and to think a little broader about the problems and solutions. 
At one point, we had too many balls in the air, but we managed to draw things together 
in the end, which was good. 
 
Other residents mentioned how the administrative facilitator insisted on following the 
overall rules and principles of the task group format, which might have held back the innovation 
process slightly. The group ultimately produced a new handbook with all of the relevant service 
information, including a transparent procedure for getting on the waiting list for a new dwelling. 
The policy recommendations were later accepted and implemented in the organization by the 
political governing board. The board completed the process by thanking the participants and 
expressing appreciation for their work. The participating residents responded by sharing how 
much they had enjoyed participating and how proud they were of the results of the group. 
 
The process of the task group has been transparent and open towards the rest of the 
organization. Despite the access being restricted, the participation was meaningful. The 
participants have all been discussing, giving inputs and expressing opinions. The residents were 
satisfied with participating in the task group, and they explain how they were honored to be a 
part of the group, which might have encouraged them to contribute even more. The outcome of 
the task groups were solutions secured through the active involvement and problem-focused 
policy deliberations between the residents and their political representatives. The use of 
collaborative policy arenas has strengthened the relations in the organization by improving 
participation, which contributed to new and better policy solutions. Past task groups have 
motivated new residents to play a more active role in the local resident democracy. The general 
attitude among the participants was that the solutions emerging from the task group were more 
improvements than radical innovations, per se. However, all of the participants also found the 
ideas and solutions to be new compared to what the political and administrative leaders had been 
able to come up with. 




Design Impact on Collaboration: The Open Access Group 
The task group with open access design had a difficult start. The undefined agenda made 
for a rather chaotic first meeting, which possibly also affected the process and meetings that 
followed. The unclear agenda and lacking explanation of the background for the task group made 
it difficult for the residents to know in what they were agreeing to participate. The first meeting 
was spent trying to explain the topic of the meeting, which did not go so well. One resident 
explained: 
 
Many people came to complain about everyday things and not about the renovation, 
which was the set topic. The administrator had to keep ‘putting out fires’, and we spent 
the first meeting just getting on track with what this was all about. 
 
The importance of defining a clear agenda is quite familiar in the network management 
literature, where a missing mandate and clear description can underline how uncertain networks 
can be to manage (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). A written mandate can also limit the dilemma of 
broader inclusion of ideas versus difficulties in reaching a common understanding, because there 
is created an overall direction for the discussions. Aside from the many and broad discussions 
and complaints about various things in the first meeting, the subsequent meetings were not 
particularly deliberative. One resident describes the group as “being too much in agreement” and 
that “there was not enough discussion”. This tendency to agree might have been because the 
participants in the task group were much alike and therefore neither discussed nor exchanged 
views. This might also have been the facilitator’s influence. Because of the chaotic first meeting, 
the administrator might have felt it necessary to steer the group even more. Furthermore, the 
administrative facilitator explained how it was difficult not to intervene in the process. She was 
responsible for developing the recommendations into later strategies, so she could not help but 
think about that. 
  
Access was open in the task group, meaning that all residents were invited to participate, 
suggesting a thoroughly transparent design. Despite this openness, the housing association 
disseminated very little about the task group to the rest of the organization. The administrative 
facilitator explains that the organization had promoted it poorly. One resident describes how 
there should have been much more information before, during and after the task group meetings. 
The group did ultimately produce some policy recommendations to the political governing 
board. As one resident describes: 
 
We have not reinvented the wheel, but we did get some things on the table that I am 
not sure would have been included otherwise. 
 
Other residents mention how there seemed to be some case management during the 
meetings and between the meetings whereby the administration made some decisions without 
involving the group. That held the innovation process back a bit and eroded the trust within the 
group. 
 
The task group has to some degree helped legitimize the political solutions for the 
political representatives but due to the limited deliberations and steered process, the process did 
not have actual collaboration. Despite the open access, the task group is surprisingly opaque 




concerning procedural transparency and dissemination. While the involvement was not as active 
and deliberative as it could have been, the remaining participants enjoyed being part of the 
group, albeit they would have liked more guidance and information about the process for it to be 
more collaborative. The following table sums up the democratic norms of the two task groups. 
 




Restricted access design Open access design 
Participation 
Inclusive and meaningful 
participation 
Not inclusive, but meaningful 
participation 
 
Inclusive, but not meaningful 
participation 
Deliberation 
Discussion and exchange of 
arguments 
 
A lot of deliberation 
 
Not much deliberation 
Transparency 
Transparent procedures and 








In comparing the presented cases, I will first focus on their designs and afterwards on the 
dimensions of process and outcome as presented in figure 1. Both housing associations describe 
themselves as having a: “unilateral resident democracy with the same type of residents 
participating.” Here, unilateral refers to the fact that young people, minorities and people with 
children are not represented in the democratic organs. Positions are traditionally occupied for a 
long time in the formal decision-making arenas and boards. The meetings are usually held in the 
evening or on weekends. The housing associations have been seeking new ways to include 
residents in policy innovation and to gather opinions on pressing challenges. As part of their 
organizational strategies, both housing associations were committed to strengthening resident 
democracy, and a task group structure seemed to fit this goal. The collaborative policymaking for 
both task groups still commences and ends in the political governing board, which forms and 
determines the mandate for the task groups and discusses, amends and adopts the policy 
proposals from the continuous dialogue with the participating actors. In so doing, the importance 
of politics and the opportunity to hold political representatives accountable for policymaking on 
election day is kept (Sørensen and Torfing, 2018). The two designs differ in their openness 
concerning both accessibility and transparency. Another relevant difference is that only the 
group with restricted access has a written mandate describing the task groups and their overall 
missions. The two designs have affected the process and outcome of the collaboration between 
residents and political representatives differently. 
 
The process of the open access design provides conditions for the innovative 
policymaking that are neither particularly transparent nor deliberative. The group might also 
suffer from self-selection challenges regarding the participation. The first meeting in the open 
group was unsuccessful, which might have discouraged some residents from participating. 
Tension between deliberation and transparency developed in the open group, where the openness 




of the group ultimately hindered the deliberations and transparency. The open access design 
might at first glance seem more democratic and of more democratic quality, because of the 
inclusion of all residents. However, the design actually ends up creating tensions between its 
democratic norms constraining the productive collaboration between residents and political 
representatives. The process of the task group appears more like a consultation than an actual 
collaboration. 
 
The process of the restricted access design delivers conditions for innovative policy-
making that are not inclusive to everyone, but otherwise transparent and deliberative in its 
format. The process in the restricted group was more discussion-friendly and engaging than in 
the open group. In addition, because they were handpicked, the residents in the restricted group 
might have been more resourceful and fit for the task. Both groups seem somewhat over-
controlled by their administrative facilitators, which possibly restricted the innovative 
discussions. Still, both task groups clearly provided outcome in the form of qualified solutions to 
pressing problems to each of their organizations. Furthermore, according to residents in both task 
groups, the outcome and the final policy recommendations contained new ideas and solutions 
that would not have come up if it had not been for the work in the task group. Both task groups 
appear to have had a positive impact on the relationship between residents and their political 
representatives. In the housing association with the restricted design, new residents actually 
wanted to join the traditional democratic set-up. In both groups, the residents and political 
representatives have developed a better understanding of each other’s views and opinions after 
spending time together and solving concrete challenges that they shared in common; however, it 
is unclear how much collaboration actually took place in the open access group, where the 





There are no guarantees that innovative democratic designs will lead to solutions that 
completely cure democratic disenchantment and political illegitimacy; however, there are several 
interesting analytical discoveries concerning the collaboration that I will discuss in the following 
section. Before discussing the analytical findings, I will first reflect on the format of the two 
innovative democratic designs. The task groups incorporate elements from participatory and 
deliberative democracy within a traditional model of representative democracy. The housing 
association with the restricted access design has more experience with task groups, and they have 
inspired the housing association with the open access design to experiment with this work form. 
The housing association with the restricted design has experienced several new residents wanting 
to join local activities and contributing to the resident democracy after having participated in a 
task group. Despite innovative democratic designs, disrupting traditional models, transparency is 
maintained by the fact that the political governing board initiates and mandates the task groups 
and has the final decision on adopting their policy recommendations. Turning to comparing the 
two different innovative democratic designs of the task groups, the overall outcomes of the 
groups are positive. 
 
The most surprising finding concerns the opaqueness of the open access design, which 
seems to attract the “the usual suspects,” who are those who frequently participate in local 




activities and are possibly active in other local political governing boards too. The self-selection 
creates some measure of homogeneity in the group, where the self-selection bias limits the 
deliberation and differences between the participants. Nevertheless, selection bias also occurs in 
the group with restricted access. Here, the invited participants are chosen because they fit the 
group well and because the housing association wants to maintain some degree of control. Both 
designs exclude weak and minority groups. To include minority groups can also be difficult due 
to unrepresentative bureaucracy, where there are no representatives in the administration or the 
political top to represent minority groups (Meier, 1975). 
 
The housing association with the restricted access design has accumulated more 
experience with task groups, which might help to explain the respective design of the two 
groups. The housing association has gained positive knowledge on how to recruit participants 
and experienced the value of having a written mandate to set out direction for the group. 
Formulating a well-described written mandate for each task group, which is presented to the 
participants together with a joint discussion of outlooks and interests, can help to get everyone on 
the same page and to harmonize expectations. 
 
Both cases show that innovative democratic design strengthens the quality of political 
decisions and the relations between residents and political representatives. Both cases also show 
that the solutions in question would not have emerged without the task group and that the 
relations between residents and their political representatives have been strengthened. That might 
to some degree answer the question of whether it is possible to cure the ills of local 
representative democracy through innovative democratic designs. Despite the good intentions in 
both housing associations, organizational structures still do not entirely support the task groups. 
It remains difficult for the housing associations to reach young residents and minorities, which 
might have something to do with the traditions for when and where the meetings have been held. 
The political representatives from the political governing board receive a fee to attend the 
traditional committee meetings. They do not receive a fee to attend the task groups meetings, 
which might create an imbalance, especially if the housing associations wish to expand the task 
group work in their organization, and want to signal that the task groups are work forms that can 
supplement the traditional democratic set-up. Possible tensions between the representative 
political boards and the particular task groups can be dealt with through a written mandate. 
Furthermore, the political representatives must find a balance with respect to having insight into 
what the task group is working on while at the same time not undermining the group’s work by 
setting out a new course or changing criteria. The political board is responsible for monitoring 
the self-regulation of the task groups, which they can do via the written mandate and by 
providing brief, succinct feedback to the task groups. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks and Ways Ahead 
 
Concluding this article, I will return to the research question and the two assumptions. 
The research question asks how innovative democratic designs affect collaboration between 
residents and their political representatives. The assumptions state that (1) innovative democratic 
designs bringing residents and their political representatives together will result in productive 
collaboration and that (2) the degree of participation, deliberation and transparency in the 




democratic designs will have consequences for the collaborative process and outcome. Based on 
the presented analyses, I can confirm both assumptions for both cases. In the following, I will 
elaborate on this, as there is need for a more nuanced conclusion. 
 
This article has studied examples of innovative democratic designs in the Danish public 
housing sector that have been introduced due to challenges to democracy and political 
legitimacy. The innovative democratic designs introduced collaborative policy arenas, where 
affected residents have been mobilized and become an active resource in defining pressing 
policy problems and designing and implementing innovative policy solutions in practical work 
forums together with their political representatives. 
 
The housing associations introduce a new kind of innovative democratic design through 
the integration of elements from participatory and deliberative democracy into the traditional 
model of representative democracy, which creates a type of hybrid democracy (Sørensen and 
Torfing, 2018). This hybrid democracy brings residents together with their political 
representatives to discuss pressing problems and ambitions for policy solutions.  
 
The task group with open access design result in somewhat productive collaboration 
between the residents and their political representatives. The degree of participation, deliberation 
and transparency has some consequences for the collaborative process and outcome. The process 
of the group becomes more like a consultation, where inputs form the residents were secured to 
legitimize a political decision, than a collaboration. However, the outcome of the group was 
something that both residents and political representatives were satisfied with. The design of the 
open access group does not make the actors feel as heard, seen and included, as in the restricted 
access group. The open access task group has less meaningful participation, less deliberation and 
less transparency than the restricted access task group. The task group with the restricted access 
design has a productive collaboration between residents and their political representatives. The 
chosen residents feel heard and seen in the process and all participants are very proud of the 
outcome of the group. The two different innovative democratic designs are both contributing 
with something in each of their context. 
 
In conclusion, the design matters for innovative democratic designs. The design has 
impact on the process, outcome and democratic quality of the collaboration. The cases show that, 
when constructing innovative democratic designs, there lies a significant consideration in 
balancing openness and restriction, as different designs pose different tensions between 
democratic quality and productive collaboration.  
 
The relatively successful adaption of innovative democratic designs in both housing 
associations reveals great potential in other kinds of representative settings in local governments. 
However, I must also acknowledge the limitations of my study. I have only analyzed the designs 
and collaboration of task groups in two housing associations. Limitations regarding the data 
include that the group with the restricted access design had more experience and might have had 
more basis for reflection on their own work and actions. This study only includes data from two 
Danish cases of collaborative policymaking, which obviously limits the ability to generalize. 
There are also special conditions for the housing associations to create limits regarding the 
transferability of the findings to the greater representative democracy. Similar cases are required 




in order to determine the generic features of the tensions between democratic designs and 
collaborative policymaking. The public housing sector is developed in alignment with the 
universalistic welfare model, with a high degree of decentralization to the local level to 
encourage residents to take part. The housing associations in question are much alike, with 
similar interactions between political representatives and residents and political and 
administrative cultures. The culture of politics and administration is grounded in consensus and 
compromise with a focus on social capital and welfare solutions. The public housing sector 
remains below the national average of income and education, however, which might indicate that 
settings with higher socioeconomic factors might succeed even better when constructing 
innovative democratic designs. I can hope that other housing associations facing the same 
challenges and other sectors with similar challenges can find inspiration from these innovative 
democratic designs. 
 
To elaborate on the conclusion of this article, I want to highlight learnings about 
democratic innovations in the light of democratic disenchantment. The article tells a story on, 
how productive collaboration actually ends up costing on the democratic quality. The article 
finds a trade-off between the democratic norms, and the most productive collaboration 
concerning both process and outcome calls for restriction on democratic norms. This exploratory 
study has focused on the tensions between democracy and collaborative policymaking. The 
article has highlighted some of the tensions requiring consideration when introducing 
collaborative policy making arenas. Much of the literature utilized in this article does not 
problematize this aspect, but I stress that it is necessary to focus on it to expand the body of 
knowledge. Collaboration comes at a price and can require limitations or restriction to be 
successful. Successful collaboration also demands more of politicians. The politicians gain more 
input for their policymaking, but there are also growing demands to their representation of their 
followers. For practitioners, there might be valuable insights and considerations to be found in 
this study when introducing innovative democratic designs to an organization. 
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